A REFINEMENT OF SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM

被引：54

作者：

CHO, IK

机构：

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1987年 / 55卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913561

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1367 / 1389

页数：23

共 20 条

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