SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA

被引：1645

作者：

CHO, IK ^{[1
]}

KREPS, DM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1885060

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：179 / 221

页数：43

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[8]

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[9]

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