EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES

被引：478

作者：

BANKS, JS

SOBEL, J

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,DEPT ECON,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

[2] CALTECH,PASADENA,CA 91125

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1987年 / 55卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913604

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：647 / 661

页数：15

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Kreps D., 1985, SIGNALING GAMES STAB

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