SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引:215
作者
FUDENBERG, D [1 ]
TIROLE, J [1 ]
机构
[1] ECOLE NATL PONTS & CHAUSEES,CERAS,PARIS,FRANCE
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297414
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 247
页数:27
相关论文
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