GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS

被引：907

作者：

HARSANYI, JC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：320 / 334

页数：15

共 6 条

[1] A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM [J].

DEBREU, G .

[2]

HARSANYI JC, UNPUBLISHED

[3]

NASH J, 1951, ANN MATH, V54, P286, DOI 10.2307/1969529

[4] EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN N-PERSON GAMES [J].

NASH, JF .

[5] THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J].

Nash, John F., Jr. .

[6]

Neumann JV, 1953, THEORY GAMES EC BEHA