EFFICIENCY AND ADVERSE SELECTION

被引:9
作者
BIGELOW, JP
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(90)90038-L
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Ex-ante and interim constrained efficiency of market equilibria with adverse selection is studied. With a continuum of qualities, allocations which are attainable (i.e., feasible, incentive compatible, and individually rational) are convex combinations of one-step allocations (named for the fact that an agent's consumption is a single stepped function of quality). This makes possible a simple geometric treatment of efficiency. Competitive equilibrium is efficient if the distribution of quality is not too convex. Wilson's (Bell J. Econ. 11 (1980), 108-130) buyer's equilibrium is generically unique and efficient. An efficient Wilson's seller's equilibrium always exists. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:380 / 405
页数:26
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