MODEL OF INSURANCE MARKETS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引:499
作者
WILSON, C
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:167 / 207
页数:41
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