OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION

被引：290

作者：

PAULY, MV ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1881793

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：44 / 62

页数：19

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