THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

被引:453
作者
AXELROD, R [1 ]
DION, D [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV MICHIGAN,DEPT POLIT SCI,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109
关键词
D O I
10.1126/science.242.4884.1385
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:1385 / 1390
页数:6
相关论文
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