MORE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

被引：108

作者：

MAY, RM

机构：

来源：

NATURE | 1987年 / 327卷 / 6117期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1038/327015a0

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：15 / 17

页数：3

共 9 条

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NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) :433-435

[6] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM [J].

PACKER, C .

TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION, 1986, 1 (06) :142-142

[7]

Pitcher T.J., 1986, P294

[8] DICING WITH DEATH - PREDATOR INSPECTION BEHAVIOR IN MINNOW SHOALS [J].

PITCHER, TJ ;

GREEN, DA ;

MAGURRAN, AE .

JOURNAL OF FISH BIOLOGY, 1986, 28 (04) :439-448

[9] THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND DYNAMICAL-SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES [J].

SMALE, S .

ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) :1617-1634

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