NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME

被引:254
作者
BOYD, R [1 ]
LORBERBAUM, JP [1 ]
机构
[1] WASHINGTON UNIV, DEPT SYST SCI & MATH, ST LOUIS, MO 63130 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1038/327058a0
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:58 / 59
页数:2
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