HIERARCHICAL REGULATORY CONTROL

被引：38

作者：

DEMSKI, JS ^{[1
]}

SAPPINGTON, DEM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BELL COMMUN RES INC,MURRAY HILL,NJ

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555602

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：369 / 383

页数：15

共 24 条

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[10] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS [J].

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