IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY

被引:418
作者
DASGUPTA, P
HAMMOND, P
MASKIN, E
机构
[1] UNIV ESSEX,COLCHESTER CO4 3SQ,ESSEX,ENGLAND
[2] MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297045
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:185 / 216
页数:32
相关论文
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