OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS

被引:179
作者
DEMSKI, JS [1 ]
SAPPINGTON, D [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV PENN,DEPT ECON,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:152 / 171
页数:20
相关论文
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