THE VALUATION OF ASSETS UNDER MORAL HAZARD

被引：23

作者：

RAMAKRISHNAN, RTS

THAKOR, AV

机构：

[1] INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401

[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,CHICAGO,IL 60611

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1984年 / 39卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2327678

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：229 / 238

页数：10

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