OPTIMAL MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS AND EQUILIBRIUM SECURITY PRICES

被引：114

作者：

DIAMOND, DW

VERRECCHIA, RE

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1982年 / 37卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2327326

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：275 / 287

页数：13

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