MORAL HAZARD, AGENCY COSTS, AND ASSET PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM

被引：9

作者：

RAMAKRISHNAN, RTS

THAKOR, AV

机构：

[1] MIT, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 USA

[2] INDIANA UNIV, BLOOMINGTON, IN 47401 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 1982年 / 17卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2330905

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：503 / 532

页数：30

共 22 条

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RAVIV, A .

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[8]

HARRIS M, 1978, AM ECON REV, V68, P20

[9] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01) :74-91

[10]

HOLMSTROM B, 1981, MORAL HAZARD TEAMS

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