SIGNALING AND THE PRICING OF NEW ISSUES

被引：443

作者：

GRINBLATT, M ^{[1
]}

HWANG, CY ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PITTSBURGH,KATZ GRAD SCH BUSINESS,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1989年 / 44卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2328596

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：393 / 420

页数：28

共 22 条

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[4]

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[7] SIGNALING AND THE VALUATION OF UNSEASONED NEW ISSUES [J].

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[8] SIGNALING WITH MANY SIGNALS [J].

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[9]

ENGERS M, 1984, THESIS UCLA

[10]

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