PROTECTING THE WINNER - 2ND-PRICE VERSUS ORAL AUCTIONS

被引:21
作者
ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R
KAHN, CM
机构
[1] University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90137-A
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In oral auctions, unlike sealed-bid second-price auctions, the winner never reveals his reservation price. We investigate bidders' strategies in the two auctions when third-parties can exploit information revealed by the auction. When exploitation is likely, oral auctions are more efficient than sealed-bid second-price auctions, and preferred by all participants. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 248
页数:6
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