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PROTECTING THE WINNER - 2ND-PRICE VERSUS ORAL AUCTIONS
被引:21
作者
:
ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R
KAHN, CM
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
KAHN, CM
机构
:
[1]
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
来源
:
ECONOMICS LETTERS
|
1991年
/ 35卷
/ 03期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90137-A
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
In oral auctions, unlike sealed-bid second-price auctions, the winner never reveals his reservation price. We investigate bidders' strategies in the two auctions when third-parties can exploit information revealed by the auction. When exploitation is likely, oral auctions are more efficient than sealed-bid second-price auctions, and preferred by all participants. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 248
页数:6
相关论文
共 6 条
[1]
[Anonymous], 1967, AUCTIONS AUCTIONEERI
[2]
OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN
[J].
MYERSON, RB
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MYERSON, RB
.
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
1981,
6
(01)
:58
-73
[3]
RILEY JG, 1981, AM ECON REV, P381
[4]
WHY ARE VICKREY AUCTIONS RARE
[J].
ROTHKOPF, MH
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
ROTHKOPF, MH
;
TEISBERG, TJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
TEISBERG, TJ
;
KAHN, EP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
KAHN, EP
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1990,
98
(01)
:94
-109
[5]
PROCUREMENT AND RENEGOTIATION
[J].
TIROLE, J
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
TIROLE, J
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1986,
94
(02)
:235
-259
[6]
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
[J].
VICKREY, W
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
VICKREY, W
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1961,
16
(01)
:8
-37
←
1
→
共 6 条
[1]
[Anonymous], 1967, AUCTIONS AUCTIONEERI
[2]
OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN
[J].
MYERSON, RB
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MYERSON, RB
.
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
1981,
6
(01)
:58
-73
[3]
RILEY JG, 1981, AM ECON REV, P381
[4]
WHY ARE VICKREY AUCTIONS RARE
[J].
ROTHKOPF, MH
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
ROTHKOPF, MH
;
TEISBERG, TJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
TEISBERG, TJ
;
KAHN, EP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
KAHN, EP
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1990,
98
(01)
:94
-109
[5]
PROCUREMENT AND RENEGOTIATION
[J].
TIROLE, J
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
TIROLE, J
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1986,
94
(02)
:235
-259
[6]
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
[J].
VICKREY, W
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
VICKREY, W
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1961,
16
(01)
:8
-37
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1
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