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OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN

被引：3107
作者：
MYERSON, RB
机构：
来源：
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 1981年 / 6卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1287/moor.6.1.58
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：58 / 73
页数：16
相关论文
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[9]  
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Rockafellar R.T., 1970, CONVEX ANAL
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