WHY ARE VICKREY AUCTIONS RARE

被引：177

作者：

ROTHKOPF, MH ^{[1
]}

TEISBERG, TJ ^{[1
]}

KAHN, EP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1990年 / 98卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261670

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：94 / 109

页数：16

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