A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT TIME-PREFERENCES

被引:253
作者
RUBINSTEIN, A
机构
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D O I
10.2307/1911016
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:1151 / 1172
页数:22
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