Employment protection and takeovers

被引：137

作者：

Dessaint, Olivier ^{[1
]}

Golubov, Andrey ^{[1
]}

Volpin, Paolo ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Toronto, Rotman Sch Management, 105 St George St, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6, Canada

[2] City Univ London, Cass Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 125卷 / 02期

关键词：

Employment protection; Takeovers; Mergers and acquisitions; Synergy gains; Premiums; Efficiency; CROSS-BORDER MERGERS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; FAMILY FIRMS; LABOR; PERFORMANCE; GAINS; PROFITABILITY; UNIONIZATION; DETERMINANTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.05.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Labor restructuring is a key driver of takeovers and the associated synergy gains worldwide. In a difference-in-differences research design, we show that major increases in employment protection reduce takeover activity by 14-27% and the combined firm gains (synergies) by over half. Consistent with the labor channel behind these effects, deals with greater potential for workforce restructuring show a greater reduction in volume, number, and synergies. Increases in employment protection impede layoffs, resulting in wage costs that match the magnitude of synergy losses. Offer prices are not fully adjusted, with both bidders and targets exhibiting lower returns following the reforms. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：369 / 388

页数：20

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