DO UNION WEALTH CONCESSIONS EXPLAIN TAKEOVER PREMIUMS - THE EVIDENCE ON CONTRACT WAGES

被引:50
作者
ROSETT, JG
机构
[1] National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(90)90029-Y
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates whether union wealth concessions caused by changes in real wage growth following takeovers explain target-firm share-price premiums. Point estimates imply that union wealth changes in the six years following the acquisition account for 1% to 2% of shareholder premiums. This figure rises to 5% over 18 years. For hostile takeovers, union wealth increases by roughly 3% and 10% of shareholder gains over 6- and 18-year periods. The 95% confidence interval for wage changes implies that unions may lose up to a quarter, or gain up to a fifth, of what target shareholders gain. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 282
页数:20
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]  
ABOWD JM, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P774
[2]  
Auerbach A.J., 1988, MERG ACQUIS, P69
[3]  
BHAGAT S, 1990, RETURN CORPORATE SPE, P1
[4]  
BROWN, 1988, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, P9
[5]  
*BUR NAT AFF INC, 1976, COLL BARG NEG CONTR
[6]  
*BUR NAT AFF INC, 1987, DAIL LAB REP
[7]   MERGERS AND THE MARKET CONCENTRATION DOCTRINE - EVIDENCE FROM THE CAPITAL-MARKET [J].
ECKBO, BE .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1985, 58 (03) :325-349
[8]  
FAMA EF, 1976, F FINANCE
[9]  
HENDRICKS WE, 1985, WAGE INDXATION US CO
[10]   THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE-CONTROL - THE EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE SINCE 1980 [J].
JARRELL, GA ;
BRICKLEY, JA ;
NETTER, JM .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1988, 2 (01) :49-68