DO UNION WEALTH CONCESSIONS EXPLAIN TAKEOVER PREMIUMS - THE EVIDENCE ON CONTRACT WAGES

被引:50
作者
ROSETT, JG
机构
[1] National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(90)90029-Y
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates whether union wealth concessions caused by changes in real wage growth following takeovers explain target-firm share-price premiums. Point estimates imply that union wealth changes in the six years following the acquisition account for 1% to 2% of shareholder premiums. This figure rises to 5% over 18 years. For hostile takeovers, union wealth increases by roughly 3% and 10% of shareholder gains over 6- and 18-year periods. The 95% confidence interval for wage changes implies that unions may lose up to a quarter, or gain up to a fifth, of what target shareholders gain. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 282
页数:20
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