Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation

被引:472
作者
Chang, Xin [1 ]
Fu, Kangkang [2 ]
Low, Angie [1 ]
Zhang, Wenrui [3 ]
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore 639798, Singapore
[2] INSEAD, Singapore, Singapore
[3] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Employee stock options; Corporate innovation; Risk-taking incentives; Employee compensation; EQUITY GRANTS; INCENTIVES; RISK; CEO; PERFORMANCE; BANKRUPTCY; FIRMS; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important for innovation, when free-riding among employees is weaker, when options are granted broadly to most employees, when the average expiration period of options is longer, and when employee stock ownership is lower. Further analysis reveals that employee stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:168 / 188
页数:21
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