Managerial incentives and risk-taking

被引：1593

作者：

Coles, JL

Daniel, ND

Naveen, L

机构：

[1] Arizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

[2] Georgia State Univ, Robinson Coll Business, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 79卷 / 02期

关键词：

executive compensation; managerial incentives; risk taking; investment policy; financing policy;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：431 / 468

页数：38

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