The impact of meaningful context on strategic play in signaling games

被引:37
作者
Cooper, DJ
Kagel, JH [1 ]
机构
[1] Case Western Reserve Univ, Dept Econ, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
signaling games; experiment; context effects; limit pricing;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00025-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Psychologists have provided abundant evidence that behavior can differ in fundamental ways when problems are embedded in a meaningful, as opposed to abstract, context. Our paper explores the effects of meaningful context on behavior in a signaling game experiment. Meaningful context significantly increases the initial level of strategic play. This effect fades over time, so that meaningful context partially substitutes for experience. There is also evidence that meaningful context can fundamentally affect subjects' reasoning processes. These results suggest that meaningful context might better capture behavior in field settings and improve the performance of equilibrium refinements for certain games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:311 / 337
页数:27
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