It pays to have friends

被引:580
作者
Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun [1 ]
Kim, Seoyoung [1 ]
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
Board independence; Social ties; Executive compensation; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET; STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; BOARD COMPOSITION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS; MANAGEMENT; CEO; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.07.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Currently. a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation. exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter and that, consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:138 / 158
页数:21
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