A theory of friendly boards

被引：1268

作者：

Adams, Renee B. ^{[1
]}

Ferreira, Daniel

机构：

[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, SITE, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden

[2] SIFR, Stockholm, Sweden

[3] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2007年 / 62卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management-friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis.

引用

页码：217 / 250

页数：34

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