CEO incentives and firm size

被引：207

作者：

Baker, GP

Hall, BJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 22卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/423154

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a model that clarifies how to measure CEO incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. The crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of CEO productivity with respect to firm size. We find that CEO marginal products rise significantly with firm size (confirming Rosen's conjecture that CEOs of large firms have a "chain letter" effect on firm performance), and overall CEO incentives are roughly constant, or decline slightly, with firm size. We employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems.

引用

页码：767 / 798

页数：32

共 26 条

[1] The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation [J].