Eponymous Entrepreneurs

被引:74
作者
Belenzon, Sharon [1 ]
Chatterji, Aaron K. [1 ]
Daley, Brendan [1 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, 100 Fuqua Dr, Durham, NC 27708 USA
关键词
SIGNALING GAMES; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; PRODUCT QUALITY; RETURNS; NAME; REPUTATIONS; EQUILIBRIA; PRICES; FIRM;
D O I
10.1257/aer.20141524
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We demonstrate that eponymy-firms being named after their owners-is linked to superior firm performance, but is relatively uncommon (about 19 percent of firms in our data). We propose an explanation based on eponymy creating an association between the entrepreneur and her firm that increases the reputational benefits/costs of successful/unsuccessful outcomes. We develop a corresponding signaling model, which further predicts that these effects will be stronger for entrepreneurs with rarer names. We find support for the model's predictions using a unique panel dataset consisting of over 1.8 million firms.
引用
收藏
页码:1638 / 1655
页数:18
相关论文
共 30 条
[1]   Job market signaling and employer learning [J].
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos ;
Prat, Julien .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2012, 147 (05) :1787-1817
[2]  
AMIT R, 1990, MANAGE SCI, V36, P1232, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.36.10.1233
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1974, Market Signalling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1991, Game Theory
[5]  
BAGWELL K, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P224
[6]   EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].
BANKS, JS ;
SOBEL, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) :647-661
[7]  
Belenzon Sharon, 2017, AM EC REV
[8]   SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J].
CHO, IK ;
KREPS, DM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) :179-221
[9]   Market signaling with grades [J].
Daley, Brendan ;
Green, Brett .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2014, 151 :114-145
[10]   AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J].
FAMA, EF .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) :288-307