Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation

被引：6

作者：

Tomala, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 01, CERMSEM, F-75013 Paris, France

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1998年 / 27卷 / 01期

关键词：

repeated games; folk theorem; public signals;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01243197

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public observation is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a study of the effect of undetectable deviations and second, the definition of new types of punishments using approachability techniques.

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收藏

页码：93 / 109

页数：17

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