FINITELY REPEATED GAMES

被引：215

作者：

BENOIT, JP ^{[1
]}

KRISHNA, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912660

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：905 / 922

页数：18

共 15 条

[1]

ABREU D, 1983, THESIS PRINCETON U

[2]

[Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[3]

FRIEDMAN J, 1983, UNPUB TRIGGER STRATE

[4]

FUDENBERG D, 1984, MIT310 DEP EC WORK P

[5]

HILLE E, 1948, FUNCTIONAL ANAL SEMI

[6] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].

KREPS, DM ;

WILSON, R .

[7] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J].

MILGROM, P ;

ROBERTS, J .

[8]

Radner R., 1980, J ECON THEORY, V22, P289

[9] EQUILIBRIUM IN SUPERGAMES WITH THE OVERTAKING CRITERION [J].

RUBINSTEIN, A .

[10]

RUBINSTEIN A, 1977, 25 HEBR U CTR RES MA