NASH EQUILIBRIA OF N-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES WITH SEMISTANDARD INFORMATION

被引：41

作者：

LEHRER, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,DEPT MATH,EVANSTON,IL 60208

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1990年 / 19卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01761076

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The folk theorem is extended here to the case where after each stage of the repeated game each player is informed only about the equivalence classes of the pure actions which were used by the other players. The sets of upper equilibrium payoffs and of lower equilibrium payoffs are characterized here, and they are found to be different. © 1990 Physica-Verlag.

引用

页码：191 / 217

页数：27

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