NON-ZERO-SUM 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引:87
作者
HART, S
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,INST MATH STUDIES SOCIAL SCI,STANFORD,CA 94305
[2] CATHOLIC UNIV LOUVAIN,DEPT MATH,B-1200 BRUSSELS,BELGIUM
[3] CATHOLIC UNIV LOUVAIN,CORE,B-1200 BRUSSELS,BELGIUM
关键词
D O I
10.1287/moor.10.1.117
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:117 / 153
页数:37
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