Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania

被引：102

作者：

Pan, Lei ^{[1
]}

Christiaensen, Luc ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Wageningen Univ, Wageningen, Netherlands

[2] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2012年 / 40卷 / 08期

关键词：

local elite; decentralization; targeting; fertilizer; voucher program; Tanzania; POOR; ACCOUNTABILITY; GOVERNMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.012

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Through decentralized targeting of input vouchers new agricultural input subsidy programs aim to more effectively reach their objectives and target population. But, lingering fears of elite capture remain. These are borne out in the 2009 input voucher program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. Sixty percent of the voucher beneficiaries were households with village officials. This significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and concentration in higher trust settings mitigated these concerns. Scrutiny remains important when relying on decentralized targeting, as is a clearer sense of purpose of input vouchers. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1619 / 1633

页数：15

共 31 条

[11] Capture and governance at local and national levels [J].