Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

被引:285
作者
Francis, Bill [1 ]
Hasan, Iftekhar [2 ,3 ]
Wu, Qiang [1 ]
机构
[1] Rensselaer Polytech Inst, Lally Sch Management, Troy, NY 12180 USA
[2] Fordham Univ, Schools Business, New York, NY 10023 USA
[3] Bank Finland, Helsinki, Finland
关键词
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; MARKET VALUATION; AGENCY PROBLEMS; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP; COST; SPECIFICATION; COMPENSATION; APPOINTMENTS; COMMITTEE;
D O I
10.1111/fima.12069
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance. This relation is driven by professors without administrative positions. We also find that academic directors play an important governance role through their advising and monitoring functions. Specifically, our results show that the presence of academic directors is associated with greater acquisition performance, a higher number of patents and citations, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and higher CEO forced turnover-performance sensitivity. Overall, our results indicate that academic directors are valuable advisors and effective monitors and firms benefit from having academic directors.
引用
收藏
页码:547 / 581
页数:35
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