Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?

被引：50

作者：

Fahlenbrach, Ruediger ^{[1
,4
]}

Minton, Bernadette A. ^{[2
]}

Pan, Carrie H. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, Quartier UNIL Dorigny, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

[2] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[3] Santa Clara Univ, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA

[4] Swiss Finance Inst, Zurich, Switzerland

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2011年 / 24卷 / 10期

基金：

瑞士国家科学基金会;

关键词：

G14; G34; ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION ESTIMATOR; INVESTMENT DECISIONS; BOARD SIZE; PERFORMANCE; DETERMINANTS; SUCCESSION; TURNOVER; COMPENSATION; PRICES; POWER;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhr056

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as CEOs. Firms benefit, on average, from the presence of former CEOs on their boards. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, have higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of the successor CEO, and can rehire their former CEO directors as CEOs after extremely poor firm performance under the successor CEOs.

引用

页码：3486 / 3518

页数：33

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