Pricing internal trade to get a leg up on external rivals

被引：18

作者：

Arya, Anil ^{[1
]}

Mittendorf, Brian ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[2] Yale Univ, Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06511 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2008年 / 17卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00192.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The pricing of transfers from parent to subsidiary is an oft-explored issue. Linking the cost of internal transfers with external market prices is one common approach, typically justified when the market for the good is perfectly competitive. This paper shows that imperfect competition may also justify market-based transfer prices. Concern that transfer price will deviate from marginal cost and thereby distort subsidiary choices can lead a parent to undertake actions to influence the market price of the upstream good. Such efforts can provide a desirable strategic posture in the upstream market.

引用

页码：709 / 731

页数：23

共 23 条

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