DELEGATION AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

被引：599

作者：

VICKERS, J

机构：

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1985年 / 95卷

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2232877

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：138 / 147

页数：10

共 15 条

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