Reputation repair and corporate donations:An investigation of responses to regulatory penalties

被引:3
作者
Xue Xia [1 ]
Fei Teng [1 ]
Xiaolong Gu [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Center for Accounting, Finance, and Institutions, Business School, Sun Yat-sen University
[2] Accounting School/International Business School, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics
[3] Institute of Capital Market and Audit Governance Studies for the Great Bay Area (Guangdong, Hong-Kong, Macau),Guangdong University of Finance and Economics
关键词
Regulatory penalty; Donation; Reputation repair;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D632.9 [其他]; F832.51 []; F270 [企业经济理论和方法];
学科分类号
020204 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
According to the risk management and reputation insurance theory of corporate social responsibility, corporate donations can help a company to repair its reputation after a crisis.This study uses a propensity score matching–difference in difference(PSM + DID) methodology to investigate the charitable donation activities of companies that have been subject to regulatory penalties.The analysis of a sample of A-share listed companies in the 2004–2016 period shows that companies significantly increase their charitable donations after regulatory penalties, but this effect weakens over time.Further analysis reveals that non-state-owned companies, companies with higher ownership concentrations, and companies receiving severer penalties are more motivated to make donations after regulatory penalties.By studying the reputation repair behavior of companies that have been subject to regulatory penalties, this study offers further support for the risk management and reputation insurance theory of corporate social responsibility.It also enriches our understanding of companies’ active responses to regulatory penalties and provides insights into companies’ motives for making charitable donations.
引用
收藏
页码:293 / 313
页数:21
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