THE CONTINGENT GOVERNANCE OF TEAMS - ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY

被引：116

作者：

AOKI, M

机构：

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1994年 / 35卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2527079

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The first purpose of this paper is to design a model of governance structure, called the contingent governance, which can control the free-riding problem in teams in the second-best manner. The second is to show, by a new method of comparative static analysis, that the effectiveness of the contingent governance may be enhanced by complementary institutional arrangements of the imperfect labor market and bank-centered financial system. The paper discusses the implications of such institutional complementarity for the dynamic change of the Japanese main bank system and financial system design of transitional economies.

引用

页码：657 / 676

页数：20

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