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FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING
被引:3165
作者
:
DIAMOND, DW
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DIAMOND, DW
机构
:
来源
:
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
|
1984年
/ 51卷
/ 03期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.2307/2297430
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
引用
收藏
页码:393 / 414
页数:22
相关论文
共 19 条
[1]
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT FINANCING DECISIONS AND THE VALUE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
[J].
CAMPBELL, TS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
FED RESERVE SYST,DIV RES & STAT,BANKING SECT,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
FED RESERVE SYST,DIV RES & STAT,BANKING SECT,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
CAMPBELL, TS
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS,
1979,
14
(05)
:913
-924
[2]
ON THE POSITIVE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN ALLOCATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL IN A MARKET WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
[J].
CHAN, YS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
CHAN, YS
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1983,
38
(05)
:1543
-1568
[3]
OPTIMAL MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS AND EQUILIBRIUM SECURITY PRICES
[J].
DIAMOND, DW
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DIAMOND, DW
;
VERRECCHIA, RE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
VERRECCHIA, RE
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1982,
37
(02)
:275
-287
[4]
BANK RUNS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND LIQUIDITY
[J].
DIAMOND, DW
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
DIAMOND, DW
;
DYBVIG, PH
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
DYBVIG, PH
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1983,
91
(03)
:401
-419
[5]
OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
[J].
HARRIS, M
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
HARRIS, M
;
RAVIV, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
RAVIV, A
.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,
1979,
20
(02)
:231
-259
[6]
MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS
[J].
HOLMSTROM, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HOLMSTROM, B
.
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1982,
13
(02)
:324
-340
[7]
MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY
[J].
HOLMSTROM, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HOLMSTROM, B
.
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1979,
10
(01)
:74
-91
[8]
RISK-AVERSION WITH RANDOM INITIAL WEALTH
[J].
KIHLSTROM, RE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
KIHLSTROM, RE
;
ROMER, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
ROMER, D
;
WILLIAMS, S
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
WILLIAMS, S
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1981,
49
(04)
:911
-920
[9]
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
[J].
LELAND, HE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
LELAND, HE
;
PYLE, DH
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
PYLE, DH
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1977,
32
(02)
:371
-387
[10]
MACHINA M, 1983, TEMPORAL RISK NATURE
←
1
2
→
共 19 条
[1]
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT FINANCING DECISIONS AND THE VALUE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
[J].
CAMPBELL, TS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
FED RESERVE SYST,DIV RES & STAT,BANKING SECT,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
FED RESERVE SYST,DIV RES & STAT,BANKING SECT,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
CAMPBELL, TS
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS,
1979,
14
(05)
:913
-924
[2]
ON THE POSITIVE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN ALLOCATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL IN A MARKET WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
[J].
CHAN, YS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
CHAN, YS
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1983,
38
(05)
:1543
-1568
[3]
OPTIMAL MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS AND EQUILIBRIUM SECURITY PRICES
[J].
DIAMOND, DW
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DIAMOND, DW
;
VERRECCHIA, RE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
VERRECCHIA, RE
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1982,
37
(02)
:275
-287
[4]
BANK RUNS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND LIQUIDITY
[J].
DIAMOND, DW
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
DIAMOND, DW
;
DYBVIG, PH
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
DYBVIG, PH
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1983,
91
(03)
:401
-419
[5]
OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
[J].
HARRIS, M
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
HARRIS, M
;
RAVIV, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
RAVIV, A
.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,
1979,
20
(02)
:231
-259
[6]
MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS
[J].
HOLMSTROM, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HOLMSTROM, B
.
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1982,
13
(02)
:324
-340
[7]
MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY
[J].
HOLMSTROM, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HOLMSTROM, B
.
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1979,
10
(01)
:74
-91
[8]
RISK-AVERSION WITH RANDOM INITIAL WEALTH
[J].
KIHLSTROM, RE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
KIHLSTROM, RE
;
ROMER, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
ROMER, D
;
WILLIAMS, S
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08540
WILLIAMS, S
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1981,
49
(04)
:911
-920
[9]
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
[J].
LELAND, HE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
LELAND, HE
;
PYLE, DH
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720
PYLE, DH
.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE,
1977,
32
(02)
:371
-387
[10]
MACHINA M, 1983, TEMPORAL RISK NATURE
←
1
2
→