EX-POST INFORMATION IN AUCTIONS

被引:59
作者
RILEY, JG
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297392
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:409 / 429
页数:21
相关论文
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