BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS

被引：219

作者：

MCAFEE, RP

MCMILLAN, J

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555714

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：326 / 338

页数：13

共 13 条

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[2]

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[3]

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GROSSMAN, SJ ;

HART, OD .

[6]

LAFFONT J, 1985, AUCTIONING INCENTIVE

[7] OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WITH RISK AVERSE BUYERS [J].

MASKIN, E ;

RILEY, J .

[8] SELLING TO RISK AVERSE BUYERS WITH UNOBSERVABLE TASTES [J].

MATTHEWS, SA .

[9]

MCAFEE RP, 1986, 10 U W ONT CTR DEC S

[10]

MCAFEE RP, 1986, INCENTIVES GOVT CONT