MISTAKES ALLOW EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME

被引:151
作者
BOYD, R
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80188-2
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:47 / 56
页数:10
相关论文
共 9 条
[1]   THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J].
AXELROD, R ;
HAMILTON, WD .
SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) :1390-1396
[2]  
Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[3]   NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J].
BOYD, R ;
LORBERBAUM, JP .
NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) :58-59
[4]   EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL-BEHAVIOR BY RECIPROCATION [J].
BROWN, JS ;
SANDERSON, MJ ;
MICHOD, RE .
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1982, 99 (02) :319-339
[5]  
FARREL J, IN PRESS THEOR POP B
[6]  
Maynard Smith J., 1982, pi
[7]   THE EVOLUTION OF HELPING-BEHAVIOR IN LARGE, RANDOMLY MIXED POPULATIONS [J].
PECK, JR ;
FELDMAN, MW .
AMERICAN NATURALIST, 1986, 127 (02) :209-221
[8]  
RASMUSEN E, IN PRESS GAMES INFOR
[9]  
Sugden R., 1986, EC RIGHTS COOPERATIO