OPTIMAL CARTEL EQUILIBRIA WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING

被引：310

作者：

ABREU, D

PEARCE, D

STACCHETTI, E

机构：

[1] YALE UNIV,COWLES FDN,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520

[2] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

[3] UNIV MINNESOTA,INST MATH & APPLICAT,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1986年 / 39卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：251 / 269

页数：19

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