AN EXAMPLE OF A REPEATED PARTNERSHIP GAME WITH DISCOUNTING AND WITH UNIFORMLY INEFFICIENT EQUILIBRIA

被引：86

作者：

RADNER, R

MYERSON, R

MASKIN, E

机构：

[1] NYU,NEW YORK,NY 10003

[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

[3] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297591

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：59 / 69

页数：11

共 8 条

[1]

ABREU D, 1984, OPTIMAL CARTEL EQUIL

[2]

FUDENBERG D, 1985, WORKSHOP REPEATED GA

[3]

Fudenberg D., 1983, FOLK THEOREM REPEATE

[4] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J].

RADNER, R .

RADNER, R .

[6]

RADNER R, 1985, UNPUB EC J

[7]

RADNER R, 1986, UNPUB INFORMATION IN

[8] EQUILIBRIUM IN SUPERGAMES WITH THE OVERTAKING CRITERION [J].

RUBINSTEIN, A .