REPEATED PARTNERSHIP GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING AND NO DISCOUNTING

被引：86

作者：

RADNER, R

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297590

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：43 / 57

页数：15

共 20 条

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